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not being requested as a safeguard for defendants who belong to minority
races. When a colored man is on trial for a crime, his equality is guaranteed under the law; that fact is fundamental. For this reason the effectiveness of the instruction may be doubted. Granted that jurors do not
always decide cases according to the law given them, nevertheless there are
jurors who make an honest effort to follow the law as given to them by
the court in its instructions. On the whole it would seem that as a means
of overcoming prejudice, not only in cases of negro defendants and witnesses, but of other minority races and nationalities as well, such instructions
are likely to prove beneficial. The great weight of the authorities hereinabove discussed establish that the defendant is entitled to this instruction
as a matter of right. Perhaps lawyers should avail themselves of such instructions, in proper cases, much oftener than is the current practice.
LAWRENCE

SPECIAL APPEARANCE

A.

MARTY

TO PROTECT PROPERTY IN ATTACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

In an action against a non-resident defendant, begun by a preliminary
or concurrent attachment of the non-resident's property located within the
state, and where service is procurred by publication or by out of state
service, the court merely acquires jurisdiction over the attached property,'
and not over the person of the defendant. 2 It is generally held that the
non-resident may enter a special appearance to object to the court's jurisdiction over the attached property and still limit the liability of the defendant to an in rem judgment. 3 There is a split of authority on the effect
4
of an attack on the attachment on other bases than jurisdictional grounds.
The problem presented in this note goes one step further than this: can the
non-resident defendant appear specially, defend to the merits, and hence
not subject to personal liability, but rather limit recovery to the property
5
brought under the jurisdiction of the court by the preliminary attachment?
The leading cases holding that the defendant is an attachment action
1. This particular type of jurisdiction has commonly been called "quasi in rem", but is
referred to throughout this article as in rem jurisdiction because its effects and
character is typical of the in rem action.
2. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed 565 (1877); Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185,
7 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed. 372 (1886); Clymore v. Williams, 77 IlL. 618 (1875); King v.
Vance, 46 Ind. 246 (1874); Epstein v. Salorgne, 6 Mo. App. 352 (1878); Robinson v.
Nat. Bank, 81 N.Y. 385 (1880); Bates v. Crow, 57 Miss. 676 (1880).
3. Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U.S. 31, 33 S.Ct. 694, 57 L.Ed. 1053 (1913) ; Davis v.
Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 217 U.S. 157, 30 S.Ct. 463, 54 L.Ed. 708, 27 L.R.A.
(NS) 823, 18 Ann. Cas. 907 (1909); Meyer v. Brooks, 29 Ore. 203, 44 P. 281, 54 Am.
St. Rep. 790 (1896); Adams v. Trepanier Lumber Co., 117 Ohio St. 298, 158 N.E.
541, 55 A.L.R. 1118 (1927); Chubbuck v. Cleveland, 37 MinD. 466, 35 N.W. 362, 5
Am. St. Rep. 864. Likewise in Tabor v. Baer, 107 W.Va. 594, 149 S.E. 675 (1929), a
motion to dismiss an attachment case, solely on the ground that no property was
attached and the order of publication was insufficient, constituted a special appearance.
5. For other articles on the same problem see: 18 Ford. L. Rev. 73 (1949); 97 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 403 (1949); 25 Iowa L. Rev. 329 (1940).
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can appear specially for the purpose of limiting the recovery to the property attached are Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes6 and Salmon Falls Manufacturing Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co. 7 In the Cheshire case the
court said: "it would be unreasonable to oblige any man living in one state,
and having property in another state, to make himself amenable to the
courts of the last state, that he might defend his property there attached." 8
This same court argued that allowing non-resident defendants to defend
to the merits in the in rem action by entering a special appearance would
not create any impairment on the doctrine of res judicata if the plaintiff
subsequently brings another action on the same cause of action by acquiring
personal jurisdiction over the defendant or by attaching other property of
the defendant. To justify this dictum the court agrued that the estoppel
must effect both parties to the same degree before the doctrine of res judicata
is applied, and that it only effects both parties to the same degree when it
is applied as to the specific property attached. 9
The rule of the Cheshire case was wholly approved in both "its reasoniing and conclusion" in the case of Salmon Falls v. Midland Tire & Rubber
Co.1o In that case the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that where the
defendant appears specially to defend the attached property that the "recovery is to. be satisfied only from the attached property""1 and thus the
defendant is not subject to a personal judgment.
The American Law Institute in its Restatement of Judgments adopts
the view of the Cheshire and Salmon Falls cases:
"If in a proceeding begun by attachment or garnishment or
by a creditor's bill in a court which has no jurisdiction over thedefendant, he enters an appearance for the purpose of contesting
the validity of the plaintiff's claim, he does not thereby subject
himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court, if in appearing
he states that he does not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
12
court."

The comment following this section in the Restatement of Judgments makes
it clear that this stand is taken because of the so-called "dilemma" that
the defendant would be forced into if he could not make a special appearance for the sole purpose of defending his attached property. As Mr. Austin
W. Scott, the Committee Reporter, said in the proceedings to the adoption
of this section of the Restatement of Judgments, "But where his [the defendant's] property has been atttached must he either kiss it goodbye or
submit himself generally to the jurisdiction?" 1 3 The adoption of this
G. 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
7. 285 F. 214 (C.C.A. 6th, 1922).
8. Quotation from an earlier Massachusetts case: Bissel v. Biggs, 9 Mass. 462 at 468, 6
Am. Dec. 88 (1812), which was quoted in and approved by the court in the Cheshire
case, page 502.
9. Supra note 6, at 502.
10. Supra note 7, at 219.
I!. Id. at 222.
12. Restatement, Judgments: Sec. 40 (1942), Appearance to Defend on the Merits.
1. 19 Proceedings, A-L.I. 291 - 301 (1941-1942).

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

section was their solution to this problem. In the Comment following this
section it is further noted that:
"It is reasonable that the defendant should not be subjected
to this dilemma. Accordingly, he is permitted to enter an appearance in the action for the purpose of contesting the validity of the
Plaintiff's claim without4 subjecting himesli personally to the jurisdiction of the court.'

Another policy argument that might be raised in conjunction with the
Restatement's "dilemma" argument is that the non-resident's choice between defending or forfeiting his attached property by default is made more
difficult by the possibility of local prejudice and bias against a non-resident.
There are those who favor a special appearance rule in situations in
which the non-resident defendant would otherwise be forced to defend in
an inconvenient court. 15 It has been argued that the non-resident defendant's witnesses will probably reside in his locality and "he is faced with
the expense of transporting them to the place of trial or of taking depositions, an expensive and clearly less effective mode of proof than oral testimony."' 16 Rules of procedure and evidence might also be quite unfavorable to the defendant in the state where his property is attached. Thus it
is contended that a special appearance ought to be permitted in these situations by construing procedural problems and rules of appearance in view
7
of the principal of forum non conveniens.1
These are the arguments that have been raised in favor of a special
appearance rule for non-resident defendants in actions begun by attachment. Upon closer examination of these arguments supporting the Cheshire, Salmon Falls, and Restatement view, however, there seems to be certain fallacies to each of these arguments which negative any reasoning
heretofore presented in favor of the special appearance rule.
The "dilemma" argument brought out by the Restatement completely
disregards the actuality that the defendant either does or does not have a
valid defense to the plaintiffs claims; and if he does have a valid defense,
he will not be afraid to come into court and settle the controversy. This
type of a defendant believes in his defense, his thoughts are of winning
and thereby quieting the plaintiff's claim against the attached property.
To ask this defendant to choose between forfeiting his property by default
or defend on a in personam basis is not to cast him into a "dilemma", nor
is it an unreasonable choice for the defendant with a good defense to make.
It is, however, a difficult choice for the defendant who knows he has either
a very weak defense or no defense to the plaintiff's claim. It is this defendant who would like to delay the plaintiff's rightful recovery by limiting
recovery to the property attached. This type of a defendant is cast into a
14. Supra note 12, at 154.
15. 18 Ford. L. Rev. 73, 87 (1949).
16. Id. at 86.

17. For a well-formulated discussion of the doctrine of forum Pon conveniens
Calif. L. Rev. 380 (1947).

see 35
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dilemma. It is a dilemma, however, caused by his knowledge that he is
obligated to this plaintiff, but desires not to meet this obligation or loose
the attached property. This type of defendant will only defend if given
the opportunity to defend on a limited liability basis.
There is also another situation in which the defendant does not know
the value of his defense. If this be the case, he should be willing to put the
issues he might raise by his defense before "twelve men, tried and true"
and settle the controversy once and for all. It is possible that this defendant's choice involves weighing the value of the attached property
against the chances of defeating recovery by the plaintiff or a personal
judgment against himself. However, this is not an unreasonable choice to
make; it is the same choice as the defendant in other type of action has to
make: defend to the merits or suffer the consequences of a default judgment.
. Under the rule of the Cheshire and Salmon Falls cases and the Restatement of Judgments, the defendant can enter a special appearance and defend to the merits, but an ajudication of the suit merely operates as a bar
Thus, should the plaintiff loose the
only as to the attached property.'
action by either attaching
a
subsequent
bring
he
could
attachment action,
the defendant. Likewise,
on
service
other property or by acquiring personal
and the attached propaction
should the defendant loose the attachment
erty did not cover the total amount of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff
would have to start his action all over again by attaching different property
or acquiring personal service, and the defendant would be allowed to
defend even though he lost the first attachment action. There is an inconsistency with the doctrine of res judicata in a rule which permits such
a result. This inconsistenCY, ho'WeVeT, is cTrected by hOlding in any subsequent action by the plaintiff, as was done by a Mississippi court in Harn20
9
ischfeger v. Sternberg Dredging Co.,' that a defense in an in rem action
is res judicata and cannot be asserted in the subsequent action. Since the
bar raised by the doctrine of res judicata must equally effect both parties,
it would logically follow, although the Harinschfegercase does not expressly
state so, that the plaintiff cannot assert his cause in any subsequent action
if he lost the prior attachment action. Thus, the ultimate result of the
Harnischfeger rule would be to make a prior attachment suit where a
special appearance was allowed to defend to the merits of the same effect
as if it were originally deemed to be a general appearance.
Actually
Restatement
benefit of a
advantagous

ii the procedure as set out by the Cheshire, Salmon Falls, and
view were followed, contra to the Harnischfeger rule, the
special appearance by the non-resident defendant is not so
as it might seem. Most defendants look at the rule as an

18. Supra note 6 at 502, note 14 at 154, and note 12, Comment "a" following section 40.
19. 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939).
20. The previous in rem action was in the district court for the state of Louisiana, see
154 So. 10 (1934).
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opportunity to defend an interest on a limited liability basis. What these
defendants often fail to realize is that even if they should successfully defend their attached property, they still have not quieted the plaintiff's claim
as to other property or against them personally.
The contention that a dilemma may be caused by the possibility of
local prejudice and bias against a non-resident defendant is an antiquated
view with little or no merit. It is true that removal to federal courts in
diversity of citizenship cases in available, 2' but the present necessity of
removal on such grounds is open to question. Removal of a cause to the
federal courts was created because of the condition of state rivalry that
existed during the formative era of the United States and at the end of the
Civil War. 22 This condition can hardly be said to exist today. The fact
that one of the parties is a resident of another state seems to make no
difference to the modern jurist . However, to those non-resident defendants who refuse to acknowledge the present lack of state rivalry, it should
be pointed out that removal to federal courts is available to them in most
instances, 23 and thus local prejudice fear can be avoided whether warranted
or not.
The fallacy of the "inconvenient court" argument 2 4 is that once the
non-resident defendant decides to defend rather than loose the attached
property, the forum is not going to become one that is more accessible
merely because such a defense will be called a special appearance rather
than a general appearance. The problem of which rule should be adopted
does not depend upon this policy consideration even though it may be
present in the action.
While the Harinschfeger rule will correct the effects of the Cheshire,
Salmon Falls, and Restatement rule, it would be more practical for trial
courts to hold that defenses to the merits in actions begun by attachment
will constitute a general appearance and will thereby subject the defendant
to personal liability. The authority for this view is Grant v. Kellog Co. 25
In that case the defendant ,a non-resident corporation, wished to appear
to defend an action begun by an attachment of certain bank accounts. The
defendant fearing such a defense might be a general appearance, made a
motion to allow a special appearance to defend. The federal district court
denied the motion and based their reasoning on and quoted from Moore's
Federal Practice,2 6 in which it is pointed out that a defense to the merits
goes to the essence of the personal claim as well as the claim against the
property. Professor Moore reasons that: "the defendant, being willing to
21. U.S.C., sec. 1441 (1949).
22. See Lewis, Removal of Causes, page 5 (1923.). See also Friendly, The Historical Basis
of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv .L. Rev. 483 (1928); and Frank, The Historical
Basis of the Federal Judicial System, 41 Law and Contemporary Problems 3,23 (1948).
23. See Moore, Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code 232 (1949).
24. Supra note 15.
25. 154 F.2d 59, 58 F.S. 48, 3 F.R.D. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).

26. Moore's Federal Practice, sec. 12.12 (2d ed. 1948)
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come in and litigate this claim in part so as to protect any interest in the
property, should have to let such a defense on the merits determine the
27
entire personal rights as between the parties."
Outside of the Grant case authority for the general appearance rule
seems to be limited to rulings of the English admiralty courts. These courts
have held that where the defendant appears to contest their liability in an
28
in rem action, he becomes personally liable.
Other arguments in favor of the general appearance rule are the fact
that it enables a once victorous plaintiff to bring suit on the easier-to-prove
action of debt on a judgment rather than start his case all over again in a
subsequent action. This is only fair as he has already proven his claim
once. Likewise, the general appearance rule would permit the judgment
creditor to execute on newly dsicovered property rather than force him
to bring and prove his cause all over again if the property from the first
attachment action is insufficient to cover his claim.
If the problem presented in this article were to occur in the courts of
the state of Wyoming, there would be further cause to deny a request to
enter a special appearance to defend to the merits in an attachment action.
A definition of general appearance was set forth by the Wyoming Supreme
Court in the case of Honeycutt v. Nyquist, Peterson, and Co. 29 In that case
it was said: "any action on the part of the defendant, except to object to
jurisdiction, which recognizes the case as in court will amount to a general
appearance.''30 Certainly a defense to the merits does more than question
jurisdiction. Certainly the filing of pleadings, the participation in a trial
by interrogating witnesses, and the presentation of evidence and arguments
"recognize the case as in court."
In conclusion the general appearance rule is the more favorable procedural rule in that it not only more closely fits the definition of a general
appearance, but also in that the general appearance rule does not stand as
an inconsistency with the doctrine of res judicata. If the special appearance
rule were followed, it would be the only situation in the whole field of the
law where the losing party in an ajudicated suit is given two chances in
the trial courts.
JAMES A. TILKER
27.
28.
29.
30.

Ibid.
The Dupleix [19121 P.8; The Dictator [1892] P. 304; The Gamma [1899] P. 285.
12 Wyo. 183, 74 P. 90, 109 Am. St. Rep. 975 (1903).
Id. at 92.

